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Abstract 
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1. Introduction 
“Expertise is crucial for sound policies” or at least so 
argues the European Commission, which regularly con-
sults expert groups. These groups are advisory commit-
tees composed with stakeholder representatives such 
as member states and/or interest groups. Expert 
groups are—amongst other tasks—asked by Commis-
sion services or DGs to assist in the preparation and 
formulation of new proposals and their involvement in 
the policy process is especially important at this stage 
because it enables them to shape the content of policy 
(Larsson & Murk, 2007; Princen, 2011). Given the role 
that is attributed to expert groups in the preparation of 
issues, it is quite remarkable that expert groups are 
usually not studied by looking at issue characteristics. 
In spite of this, scholars agree that the European Com-
mission uses expert groups for two reasons, namely to 
engage in problem-solving and to mobilise support 
(Larsson & Murk, 2007; Robert, 2010, 2013). On one 
hand, problem-solving assumes that expert groups 
possess private information that is essential for the 
substantive quality of a proposal (Heard-Laureote, 
2010). This suggests that the Commission services ask 
such groups to assist in the preparation of issues re-
garding which it experiences uncertainty. On the other 
hand, mobilising support assumes that experts act as 
representatives and that they may signal information 
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about member state and interest group preferences 
regarding an issue (Haverland, 2009; Haverland & 
Liefferink, 2012). It is argued here that such infor-
mation is especially relevant for Commission services 
when preparing policies on salient issues. This paper 
therefore asks the following question: Do the uncer-
tainty and salience of issues determine whether the 
European Commission uses an expert group or not to 
assist with policy formulation? 
Until now the system of expert groups was per-
ceived as being particularly fragmented and lacking 
structure (Larsson & Murk, 2007). This is especially 
troublesome given the overall size of a system that cur-
rently includes 358 expert groups active in policy for-
mulation (European Commission, 2014). Some evi-
dence suggests that the use of expert groups varies by 
policy area given that the Commission services which 
are responsible for the drafting of proposals are also in 
control of administering the expert groups (Douillet & 
de Maillard, 2010; Gornitzka & Sverdrup, 2008; Hra-
banski, 2010). However, Gornitzka and Sverdrup (2008) 
added in a single effort that the system is as much a 
plethora of “issue- and policy-specific constituencies 
that evolve according to different logics” (p. 746). Ex-
pert groups are therefore often perceived as commit-
tees that further amplify sectoral differentiation within 
the European Union. Hence, previous studies were far 
from encouraging systematic comparisons of the use of 
expert groups across issues. But despite the diversity 
and the overall size of the system, expert groups are al-
so not omnipresent in EU policy-making as they do not 
assist in the preparation of each proposal. For instance, 
expert groups did not appear to play a role in the draft-
ing of a major initiative such as “A Clean Air Pro-
gramme for Europe” (European Commission, 2013). 
This is puzzling because the lack of attention to issue 
characteristics left scholars wondering why the Euro-
pean Commission was using an expert group to assist 
in the preparation of some policy proposals while con-
sulting no expert group regarding others. This paper 
addresses that gap by testing whether issue character-
istics affect the presence or absence of expert groups 
in policy formulation. Hereafter issue characteristics 
are studied along two main lines, namely that of “un-
certainty” and “salience”. First, and while considering 
that expert groups sometimes engage in problem-
solving, it should be relevant to study the effect of is-
sue uncertainty on the use of expert groups. Uncertain-
ty points to the incapability of policy-makers to under-
stand an issue. Second, and after taking into account 
that expert groups may also be used by the Commis-
sion to mobilise support, it should be relevant to study 
the effect of issue salience on the use of expert groups. 
Salience refers to the political sensitivity of an issue for 
member states and interest groups. 
Hereafter literature on expert groups and 
knowledge utilisation will be introduced. Afterwards, 
theories on executive politics will be addressed and 
based on the former, three hypotheses will be formu-
lated which link issue characteristics to the use of ex-
pert groups. Data and methods will then be discussed 
before the empirical results are presented. Finally, con-
cluding remarks about the research and its implications 
for future work on expert groups will be presented. 
2. Expert Groups and the Black Box of Issue 
Characteristics 
Since the European Commission created a register for 
expert groups in 2005, scholars have noted an increase 
in the Commission’s use of them (Gornitzka & Sverdrup, 
2008). Their proliferation in number was one reason 
for a renewed interest amongst academics in the phe-
nomenon, although issue characteristics were never 
explicitly addressed to explain variation and instead 
they remained in a figurative black-box. Pioneer con-
tributions focused on who these experts actually were 
and how these groups were configured (Gornitzka & 
Sverdrup, 2008; Larsson & Murk, 2007). Another rea-
son for interest resided in transparency issues regard-
ing these groups’ composition and use due to which 
research focused mainly on the interactions occurring 
inside these groups while trying to determine the log-
ic(s) underlying their use. Academic efforts here mainly 
aimed at demonstrating that expertise is not used a 
priori in a neutral, objective or apolitical way (Robert, 
2010). However, the mushrooming of expert groups by 
now appears to have stabilised and although contro-
versies about transparency have remained, they no 
longer seem all that different from concerns addressed 
to other forms of committee governance in the Euro-
pean Union such as comitology or Council Working 
Groups (Brandsma, 2013; Häge, 2012). After being con-
fronted with a general lack of transparency and data 
constraints in the register of expert groups, scholars 
continued to study expert groups from similar angles. 
Following a critical report by Alter-EU (2008), Gornitzka 
and Sverdrup (2010, 2011) were again among the first 
to study in more detail the individual profiles of these 
experts, with Chalmers (2013) and Rasmussen and 
Gross (2014) following in their footsteps. Rimkuté and 
Haverland (2014) in turn explained why the European 
Commission actually uses expert groups, especially 
those composed of scientists. Taken together, there 
was little prospect that anyone would unpack the black 
box surrounding issue characteristics. 
Quite recently, however, Metz (2013) explicitly ad-
dressed the matter and showed that the system of ex-
pert groups is less of a sui generis phenomenon than is 
often presumed. Based on semi-structured interviews 
and official documents, she argued that expert groups 
“feed into the preparatory work in multiple 
ways…depending on the issue context and the policy 
maker’s corresponding demands” (p. 276). While one 
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could expect issue uncertainty and salience to play a 
more prominent role in such qualitative research (be-
cause data collection may pose fewer problems here), 
previous work was mostly constructivist in nature and 
tended to focus on the socialization processes occur-
ring within these committees (Hrabanski, 2010; Robert, 
2010). As such, the importance of experts to lend polit-
ical authority and legitimacy to an initiative is stressed 
because committees are consulted to forge a European 
consensus (Douillet & de Maillard, 2010; Robert, 2013). 
Alternatively, literature on knowledge utilisation 
mainly explains that policy-makers may resort to ex-
pertise for different political motives (Boswell, 2008; 
Radaelli, 1999). This is relevant to understanding how 
issue uncertainty and salience may incite Commission 
services to consult an expert group (Rimkuté & Haver-
land, 2014). The instrumental use of knowledge implies 
on one hand that policy-makers seek substantive ad-
vice from expert groups about issues which they do not 
understand adequately. Hence, whether expert groups 
are used according to a problem-solving logic should be 
linked to the level of uncertainty experienced by the 
Commission. Metz (2013) stated in that respect that 
expert groups are used mostly regarding issues that 
contain technical details (pp. 274-275). On the other 
hand, the Commission may equally use an expert group 
to foster consensus (Douillet & de Maillard, 2010; 
Metz, 2013). While expert groups offer non-binding 
advice and experts only act as informal representatives 
in these groups, a consensus between national experts 
in favour of an issue gives the Commission a powerful 
argument against subsequent political opposition. Cor-
respondingly, Metz (2013) pointed out that expert 
groups are also relevant for tackling “controversial” is-
sues which, again, hints at the relevance of studying is-
sue salience. Furthermore, knowledge is sometimes al-
so used solely for strategic purposes in order to 
substantiate pre-determined policy positions (Boswell, 
2008). However, this strategic use takes place rather 
exceptionally while the instrumental use of knowledge 
is considered predominant (for instance, Rimkuté & 
Haverland, 2014). This research therefore focuses 
mainly on the latter. The following section further 
specifies on which theoretical grounds issue uncertain-
ty and thereafter issue salience are related to the use 
of expert groups by Commission services. 
3. The Effect of Uncertainty and Salience on Expert 
Groups 
Uncertainty is defined as the incapability of policy-
makers to tackle a policy problem by formulating a so-
lution. Although uncertainty can also arise from causes 
rooted in a unique policy context, the present focus lies 
on causes that multiple proposals have in common. 
Two such causes, transversality and standard-setting, 
will be discussed hereafter. While acknowledging that 
other determinants of uncertainty may exist as well, 
transversality and standard-setting should frequently 
create an information disadvantage for the European 
Commission due to which the latter is expected to sys-
tematically seek advice from expert groups under 
these circumstances. An information disadvantage re-
fers to a situation in which information is asymmetri-
cally divided at the expense of the European Commis-
sion (Delreux, 2011, pp. 54-55). Actors that possess 
private information enjoy in particular an information 
advantage compared to other actors which are also in 
need of that information, and such asymmetry is in 
turn reflected in their bargaining position (Banks & 
Weingast, 1992; Calvert, 1985; Pollack, 2003, pp. 27-
28). Applied with regard to EU policy formulation, this 
suggests that the European Commission can cope with 
uncertainty by consulting stakeholders such as interest 
groups, member states, etc. who possess private in-
formation. The more uncertain the Commission is, the 
more likely it is that it will seek external advice for in-
strumental purposes (Haas, 1992, Haverland, 2009). 
Admittedly, the Commission also has alternative means 
of expertise at its disposal for this purpose. Outsourc-
ing consultation to a private consultancy is one such 
option, but a relatively expensive one. Organising 
workshops/seminars/etc. is another alternative, alt-
hough they comprise only ad hoc meetings whereas 
expert groups have the advantage of meeting recur-
rently. This enables the latter to give advice throughout 
the entire process of policy formulation, which should 
render expert groups highly effective to tackle issue 
uncertainty. 
Transversality points to the cross-cutting nature of 
policy proposals as their impact may spread across 
multiple policy areas (European Commission, 2009). 
For instance, the “Proposal for a Directive on public 
procurement” (European Commission, 2011) would 
qualify as a cross-cutting initiative because public pro-
curement takes place in all policy areas, meaning that 
the initiative is of interest for most public actors as well 
as for the private actors that carry out tenders. As a 
consequence of their cross-cutting nature, transversal 
proposals easily exceed the competence area of the 
leading DG that is preparing them. Commission ser-
vices are organised along functionally specialised lines 
(Egeberg, 2012) and so a trade-off is likely to occur be-
tween issue transversality and the problem-solving ca-
pacity of a leading service regarding that issue. Put dif-
ferently, transversality is detrimental to the problem-
solving capacity of individual DGs and gives way to in-
formation asymmetries. This is relevant because bu-
reaucratic politics are at play between DGs during poli-
cy formulation (Cini, 1996). Due to their diverging 
policy portfolios, ideological beliefs, and other related 
factors, individual DGs may develop preferences for 
particular policy proposals which ultimately need to 
converge into a common position (Hartlapp, Metz, & 
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Rauh, 2013). Although a leading DG could in principle 
cope with transversality by involving other DGs more 
closely in the preparation of an initiative, this could al-
so weaken the bargaining position of the former to-
wards the latter. Seeking external advice is a viable al-
ternative as expert groups can evenly provide 
information about the cross-cutting nature of an issue 
to a leading DG. In addition, using an expert group al-
lows the leading DG to somewhat limit the involve-
ment of other DGs in the formulation of the initiative. 
The first hypothesis therefore states: 
H1: The more transversal an issue is, the more likely 
it is that a leading DG will consult an expert group. 
Standard-setting describes the importance of quantifi-
able information (like indicators, standards, targets) for 
the attainment of a policy goal in a proposal. Indica-
tors, standards or targets are referred to collectively as 
“quantified measures” because quantitative data is 
frequently essential for issues involving economic regu-
lation (Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2011). For instance, the 
“Proposal for a Regulation to define the modalities for 
reaching the 2020 target to reduce CO2 emissions from 
new passenger cars” illustrates this by name (European 
Commission, 2012). Quantified measures may hinder 
the formulation of a proposal by a Commission service 
in two ways. On one hand, a DG may not possess the 
necessary raw data (i.e. figures, numbers) to formulate 
a standard as the former are usually possessed by pri-
vate stakeholders or by member state administrations 
(Héritier & Lehmkuhl, 2011). On the other hand, a DG 
may encounter difficulty in interpreting the adjustment 
costs that a standard will impose on various stakehold-
ers (Majone, 2002). Thus, standard-setting activities 
should confront a leading DG recurrently with uncer-
tainty as the DG faces an information disadvantage to-
wards stakeholders such as business associations, but 
also national competent authorities who are better ac-
quainted with the specific nature of standards and 
their impact on operational activities through their dai-
ly routine. In contrast to the transversality argument, a 
leading DG cannot resolve uncertainty caused by quan-
tified measures through coordination with other DGs 
because the latter are equally prone to this infor-
mation disadvantage. At this point, a leading service is 
expected to ask an expert group for assistance. Follow-
ing a problem-solving logic, expert groups can provide 
information which helps the leading DG either to gath-
er data or to estimate the policy impact of such data. 
That is why the second hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: The more an issue involves standard-setting, the 
more likely it is a leading DG will consult an expert 
group. 
Salience refers to the political sensitivity of an issue 
(Leuffen, Malang, & Woerle, 2013). Political actors are 
expected to abstain from making public concessions on 
salient issues because salience renders proposals sus-
ceptible to heavy criticism. In anticipation of legislative 
decision-making, this should be worrisome for the Eu-
ropean Commission who wants primarily to ensure the 
adoption of its proposals in both legislative chambers. 
Moreover, this should be especially problematic in the 
Council of Ministers where there is a tendency to strive 
for consensus voting (Hayes-Renshaw, Van Aken, & 
Wallace, 2006). Hence, when a Commission service al-
ready perceives an issue as salient at the preparatory 
stage or as likely to become salient later, it will intensi-
fy contacts with member states and other stakeholders 
in secluded meetings. This way, the Commission can 
build towards a consensus out of the public eye, which 
lowers the transaction costs of negotiation for political 
actors. A suitable way of doing this is by using an ex-
pert group in advance of decision-making. Constructiv-
ist theory stresses in this respect that expert groups 
promote diffuse reciprocity between participants 
(Robert, 2010). The European Commission requires 
that experts are familiar with European decision-
making processes and capable of making compromises, 
and usually ensures that representation in the expert 
groups is balanced in terms of nationality. Given that 
meetings are restricted, expert groups are considered 
ideally suited for supranational deliberation and con-
sensus-building (Hrabanski, 2010; Robert, 2010, 2013). 
This in turn explains why the European Commission 
might again decide to consult expert groups for in-
strumental purposes, yet for reasons unrelated to 
problem-solving. When the Commission succeeds in 
convincing the experts to support its initiative, then 
their political peers will in fact have less substantive 
ground to keep opposing a political agreement later 
on. Expert groups thus have potential to facilitate deci-
sion-making and are used to mobilise support long be-
fore the onset of legislative decision-making (Larsson & 
Murk, 2007; Princen, 2011). The third hypothesis puts 
this as follows: 
H3: The more salient an issue is, the more likely it is 
that a leading DG will consult an expert group. 
Elsewhere, policy nature and, in particular, the distinc-
tion between (re)distributive and regulatory politics 
has been posited as a powerful determinant of EU poli-
cy-making (Majone, 2002). On average, DGs who for-
mulate regulatory policy for instance consulted more 
expert groups than DGs engaging in (re)distributive 
policy (Gornitzka & Sverdrup, 2008). No satisfactory 
theoretical explanation was provided for this variation, 
but Kassim et al. (2013) gave new impetus by further 
specifying this variable. While some DGs mainly focus 
on formulating new policies or legislation (i.e. legisla-
tive DGs), other DGs actually focus more strongly on 
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the enforcement of existing policies (i.e. regulatory 
DGs) and this distinction may prove relevant when 
studying the variation in the use of expert groups 
across DGs. Given that legislative DGs mostly engage in 
formulating new proposals, they are expected to de-
velop and maintain ties with diverse sets of stakehold-
ers. Thus, legislative DGs may have a greater incentive 
to use expert groups in which they can meet stake-
holders repeatedly. Meanwhile, regulatory DGs focus 
most of their attention on existing policy portfolios, 
due to which they may also depend more heavily on 
external advice when preparing new policies. 
In addition, others approached uncertainty in terms 
of legal complexity and studied the concept in relation 
to adopted legislation (for example, see Klüver, 2013; 
Reh, Héritier, Koop, & Bressanelli, 2013). They argue 
that uncertainty is reflected in the length of legal acts, 
their number of recitals, their number of legislative ar-
ticles, etc. because ‘complex’ legislation requires ‘de-
tailed elaboration’. In line with this legalist focus, one 
can alternatively argue that the drafting of legislative 
or legally-binding proposals—on average—creates 
higher transaction costs for a leading service than the 
drafting of proposals that are non-legislative or not le-
gally-binding. Henceforth, a leading service can be ex-
pected to consult expert groups, especially when draft-
ing legislative proposals. 
4. Data and Method 
Each policy proposal is considered an individual case 
and cases were identified through EUR-Lex.1 EUR-Lex is 
an online database which gathers public documents is-
                                                          
1 EUR-Lex is accessible via http://eur-lex.europa.eu 
sued by EU institutions. In 2014, the database merged 
with PRE-Lex which was formerly known to document 
legislative drafting. As such, EUR-Lex now compiles in-
formation about proposals (termed preparatory acts in 
the database) and decision-making procedures. The re-
search sample includes nearly all proposals which were 
drafted by one of four selected Commission services 
and subsequently adopted by the College of Commis-
sioners in the period between 2010 and 2013. The 
Commission services in question are DG Climate Action 
(DG Clima), DG Communications Networks, Content & 
Technology (DG Connect), DG Environment (idem) and 
DG Internal Market and Services (DG Markt). The sam-
ple was chosen to be diverse in terms of policy nature 
(Kassim et al., 2013). DG Climate Action and DG Envi-
ronment are considered ‘legislative DGs’ whereas DG 
Markt is a ‘regulatory DG’. Besides being a ‘regulatory 
DG’, DG Connect also engages in redistributive activi-
ties due to which it can be considered representative 
of those DGs that administer more hybrid policy do-
mains. This sample allows us to test the policy nature 
variable empirically and to generalise causal inferences 
for other policy-making DGs. More specifically, the 
sample includes legislative proposals for regulations, 
directives, decisions and non-legislative proposals such 
as Commission communications, green papers, rec-
ommendations and white papers. No Commission 
opinions met the sampling criteria. Commission reports 
fell outside the scope of this research as they generally 
involve evaluation or implementation rather than the 
formulation of policy. This totalled to 260 cases as is 
shown in Table 1. Most cases in the sample were pre-
pared by DG Markt followed by DG Environment, DG 
Connect and finally DG Clima. 
Table 1. Distribution of expert groups across DGs (2010‒2013). 
Commission service Number of expert groups 
assisting with policy 
formulation (column %, 
Register of Expert Groups) 
Number of proposals 
(column %, sample) 
Number of proposals where 
an expert group was used 
(% per DG, sample) 
DG Climate Action 7 (7.1%) 23 (8.5%) 10 (43.5%) 
DG Communications 
Networks, Content and 
Technology 
18 (18.2%) 37 (14.2%) 15 (40.5%) 
DG Environment 29 (29.3%) 80 (30.8%) 18 (22.5%) 
DG Internal Market and 
Services 
45 (45.4%) 120 (46.5%) 44 (36.7%) 
Total 99 (100%) 260 (100%) 87 (33.5%) 
 
 Politics and Governance, 2015, Volume 3, Issue 1, Pages 139-150 144 
The dependent variable use of expert group is dichot-
omous because the European Commission either uses 
an expert group to assist in policy formulation (= 0) or 
not (= 1). The information gathered in the register of 
expert groups is inadequate for cross-case compari-
sons, but Commission documents proved a valuable al-
ternative source for this information. Most important-
ly, the COM-documents representing an issue usually 
contain a section in which a leading DG explains how it 
conducted consultation during the course of policy 
formulation. The relevant section in a COM-document 
is usually titled “Results of consultations with the in-
terested parties and impact assessments” and one way 
to consult is of course by using an expert group. Occa-
sionally, such information is provided elsewhere in the 
preamble of the proposal instead. Otherwise, one can 
look for involvement of expert groups in Impact As-
sessment reports and Roadmap documents which oc-
casionally accompany COM-documents. In these doc-
uments a leading DG needs to justify how it took 
“Consultation and expertise” into account or in which 
way “stakeholders and experts have been consulted”. 
When the European Commission was reported to have 
consulted a group/committee/etc. in any of these 
sources, the register of expert groups was checked to 
see whether this alleged expert group actually corre-
sponded with a registered one. The dependent variable 
was then coded “1” while it was coded “0” for all other 
instances. However, the Commission may also an-
nounce in a proposal that an expert group has been es-
tablished to assist with the formulation of related initi-
atives thereafter. In such a case the dependent variable 
is also coded as “0" because the expert group did not 
yet play any actual role in preparation of the initiative 
in question. 
From 2010 onwards a total of 99 expert groups 
supposedly assisted one of four selected Commission 
services in policy formulation. Table 1 depicts the pro-
portion of expert groups used by each DG and this ap-
proximates the proportion of issues formulated by the 
DGs quite well. However, the register of expert groups 
seems to overstate the involvement of expert groups 
as the latter were only used in 33.5 % of the cases in 
the sample (see Table 1). Thus, it is possible that expert 
groups were registered to assist - among others - in 
policy formulation while they were only consulted dur-
ing the sample period for other purposes. Nonetheless 
some caveats need to be considered. On one hand, 
some expert groups assisted with preparing more than 
one proposal. In contrast, the Commission sometimes 
also asked multiple expert groups for advice about the 
same initiative. This cannot be inferred from the ag-
gregated data in Table 1. 
Independent variables are measured by multiple 
indicators which are based mostly on procedural in-
formation (see Table 2). Multiple-indicator measure-
ment is used because measurement validity benefits 
from triangulation. Besides, large-N analysis is facilitat-
ed by decomposing thick concepts such as uncertainty 
and salience into several indicators for measurement 
because the latter focus on distinct properties of the 
original concept and therefore capture the broader 
meaning of that concept (Coppedge, 1999). 
Firstly, transversality is a continuous measure 
whose operationalisation is based on two procedural 
indicators. On one hand, it was noted how many Com-
mission services took part in an inter-service consulta-
tion organised by the leading service. During this inter-
nal meeting, the leading DG reports its progress on the 
drafting of an initiative to all other concerned DGs 
(Hartlapp et al., 2013). Relevant information was ob-
tained from the Secretariat-General through personal 
correspondence. On the other hand, the number of Eu-
ropean Parliament committees that formulated an 
opinion about the adopted initiative was also meas-
ured. Relevant information was retrieved via the Legis-
lative Observatory. Despite the main focus on the Eu-
ropean Commission, there is no reason why the 
number of parliamentary committees should not vary 
along with issue transversality in a similar direction as 
the number of Commission services would. In addition, 
this also allows for inferences about cases for which in-
formation on inter-service consultations is missing (see 
Table 2). It is argued that the more transversal an issue 
is, the more DGs/committees will show interest in poli-
cy formulation and decision-making. Next, the scores 
on both indicators were standardised in order to make 
them comparable and to combine them into a single 
measure. 
Secondly, standard-setting is a continuous measure 
whose operationalisation came about in three steps. 
COM-documents were first searched for the following 
terms: “standards”, “standardi”, “indicator” and “tar-
get”. The European Commission is particularly argued 
to experience structural information deficits concern-
ing proposals that involve indicator-, standard- or tar-
get-setting. Next, the resulting search hits were all 
summed up and weighted by the length of the text 
document in which the word search took place. 
Third, salience is measured through two indicators 
which capture the amount of attention that member 
states or private stakeholders pay to an issue 
(Warntjen, 2012). On one hand, it is measured whether 
the Commission already presented information about 
the initiative to the member states at a formal Council 
meeting before policy formulation was concluded (No 
= 0, Yes = 1). An initiative should, however, be men-
tioned in the meeting agenda under the heading “Any 
other business” as the other headings concern initia-
tives which have already been adopted by the Commis-
sion. On the other hand, the number of contributions 
in response to a public/online consultation is noted be-
cause it reflects the amount of attention that an initia-
tive attracted from stakeholders (Klüver, 2013). When 
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the Commission did not organise a public consultation 
regarding an initiative, the latter was coded as “0”. 
Missing values were attributed when the number of re-
sponses to a public consultation was unknown. 
Lastly, two control variables are included in the 
analysis. Commission service is a categorical variable 
and indicates which Commission service drafted the 
policy initiative (DG Connect = 0, DG Clima = 1, DG En-
vironment = 2 and DG Markt = 3). Legal act is a dichot-
omous variable that indicates whether a case concerns a 
non-legislative (= 0) or a legislative proposal (= 1). The 
former applies to 40% and the latter to 60% of cases. 
The data was analysed using binary logistic regres-
sion analysis because the dependent variable is dichot-
omous. A Hosmer-Lemeshow test confirmed that lo-
gistic regression is an appropriate technique to analyse 
the sampling data (Field, 2013). The effects of the in-
dependent variables on the dependent variable are 
calculated using maximum likelihood estimators. Put 
differently, the study examined whether issue trans-
versality, the importance of standard-setting and the 
salience related to particular issues make it less/more 
likely for the Commission to use an expert group to as-
sist in policy formulation. 
Table 2. Operationalisation of variables. 
Variables Indicators   Values Sources Missing 
Use of expert 
group 
Does the European Commission 
report to have consulted an 
expert group during policy 
formulation? 






Transversality Combined measure of 
standardized indicators. 
 Ratio (‒1.684; 2.726) Listed below 13 
Number of DGs Number of DGs participating in 
inter-service consultation. 




Number of EP 
committees 
Number of parliamentary 
committees active on the 
proposal. 
  Ratio (1; 12) Legislative 
Observatory 
71 
Standard-setting Weighted indicator (according to 
text length). 
 Ratio (0; 22) Listed below 12 
Frequency of 
search hits 
Number of times that indicator-, 
standard- or target-setting is 
mentioned in COM-document. 
  Ratio (0; 177) Adopted proposals 
(COM-documents) 
12 
Salience      
Formal Council 
meeting 
States whether the proposal is 
discussed in the relevant Council 
configuration. 








Number of responses collected 
for a public consultation. 
  Ratio (0; 15538) Your Voice in Europe 5 
Commission 
service 
States which DG is responsible 
for policy formulation. 
  DG Connect (0); DG 
Climate action (1); 
DG Environment (2); 
DG Markt (3) 
EUR-Lex 0 
Legal act States whether the proposal is 
legally-binding. 
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5. Empirical Analysis 
Table 3 shows the results of three regression models. 
Model 1 is a baseline model and only contains the vari-
ables relating to issue uncertainty and salience, where-
as Model 2 also contains the control variables. Model 3 
presents a full model which includes an interaction 
term of transversality and standard-setting as well. The 
individual effects of these independent variables on 
the use of expert groups are demonstrated by coeffi-
cients. The latter are in fact odds ratios which repre-
sent the change in odds occurring when a particular 
category of an independent variable is met. When the 
odds ratio has a value smaller than 1, this means that 
the Commission is less likely to use an expert group 
under the given circumstances. In return, the likelihood 
that the Commission will consult an expert group in-
creases when an odds ratio is larger than 1. In the 
sample of 260 cases, 33 cases had missing values and 3 
cases exerted a disproportionate influence on the 
model. These were excluded from the analysis which 
was eventually performed on 224 issues. A comparison 
between the three models demonstrates that each 
model scored statistically significantly, but the full 
model is capable of explaining 23.6% of total variance 
while the other two models only explain 12.6% and 
18.5% as shown by their respective R-square measures. 
‒2LL expresses the amount of variance that a model 
leaves unexplained. Again, a comparison shows that 
the unexplained variance decreased most for the third 
model. Hence, the overall model fit improved after 
adding the control variables and did so again when the 
interaction term was added. Hereafter the results of 
Model 3 will be discussed in more depth. 
Firstly, transversality is related in a statistically sig-
nificant way to the use of expert groups. The direction 
of the effect is positive, as a leading service is more 
than twice as likely to consult an expert group on pro-
posals that are more transversal. Thus, the evidence 
strongly supports H1 which attributes this to the fact 
that leading DGs have a high level of discretion regard-
ing the way in which they use expert groups. This nu-
ances other recent findings about bureaucratic politics 
within the European Commission. Rivalry between dif-
ferent Commission services used to be considered det-
rimental for the coherence of policy formulated by the 
Commission because individual DGs tried to further 
their own policy goals without taking the policy goals of 
other DGs into account (Cini, 1996). However, more re-
cent work has suggested that this situation has im-
proved considerably as the Barroso presidency pro-
moted horizontal procedures to ensure consistency in 
policy formulation and also strengthened the role of 
the Secretariat-General in overseeing such coordina-
tion (Kassim et al., 2013). Internal consultations and 
procedures should therefore provide the Secretariat-
General and other concerned services with ample op-
portunities to ensure that a proposal does not work 
counterproductively relative to proposals prepared by 
other services. This suggests that the European Commis-
sion has become more effective in coping with forms of 
uncertainty that arise from transversality than it used to 
be because the rationale that underpins these internal 
consultations is one emphasising the cross-cutting na-
ture of proposals. Yet, the data shows that leading DGs 
are also more likely to meet expert groups regarding 
transversal issues, presumably because the latter are 
helpful in establishing or maintaining their privileged po-
sition in the process of policy formulation. This suggests 
that expert groups weaken horizontal coordination with-
in the Commission although concerned Commission ser-
vices occasionally attend expert meetings as well. Fur-
ther research should test whether expert groups actually 
help a leading DG to keep proposals under preparation 
below the radar of other services or whether this rela-
tion is in fact a less contentious one. 
Secondly, standard-setting also has a statistically 
significant effect on the use of expert groups. The odds 
ratio is larger than 1, meaning that the assistance of an 
expert group in the drafting of a proposal becomes 
more likely along with the importance of standard-
setting regarding that issue. This confirms the argu-
ment raised by H2. Of course, it is generally accepted 
that standard-setting may create an information disad-
vantage for political actors such as Commission ser-
vices, but empirical confirmation of the fact that Com-
mission services use expert groups in a systematic way 
to address such deficits is completely new. Previously, 
it was suggested that an expert group could assist in 
collecting relevant data or that it could provide advice 
about the impact of proposed measures. Based on the 
results depicted in Table 3, it is not possible to infer di-
rectly which reason(s) hold(s) true the most. Yet, it 
seems rather unlikely that the Commission would lack 
relevant data so frequently because the raison d’être 
of many regulatory agencies is exactly to gather, ana-
lyse and make available such data for the Commission. 
Furthermore, so-called European Standardisation Or-
ganisations are also active in creating common stand-
ards. For these reasons it seems more plausible that 
the Commission asks expert groups for feedback re-
garding estimated adjustment costs (whether the latter 
are proportional in nature, not discriminatory, etc.). 
Most suspicion surrounding the participation of private 
stakeholders in expert groups seems grounded in this 
context, where the risk for double-hatted experts is of 
course always imminent. 
However, the effects of transversality and standard-
setting should not be considered in isolation from one 
another as their interaction term also scored signifi-
cantly. Beforehand, one would expect their combined 
presence to render expert involvement more likely be-
cause a Commission service should face a severe in-
formation deficit when drafting a cross-cutting issue 
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which involves standard-setting on top. Yet, the coeffi-
cient of the interaction term is smaller than 1, which 
means that it actually mitigates the individual effects of 
transversality and standard-setting on the use of an 
expert group. Despite this mitigating effect, the likeli-
hood of using an expert group does still increase for 
cross-cutting issues which also involve standard-setting 
in comparison with issues that are only transversal or 
only involve standard-setting. Rather, the coefficient of 
the interaction term indicates that the odds do not in-
crease exponentially. It is not clear-cut what this 
means, but it seems improbable that a single expert 
group can solve an information deficit which is rooted 
in different causes. As noted in the theory section, 
transversality and standard-setting require different 
sets of expertise. Multiple expert groups might be con-
sulted to address these problems separately, but then 
again this would also require additional coordination be-
tween these groups. In this sense expert groups should 
neither be considered as a one-size-fits-all solution. 
Table 3. Logistic regression models of “use of expert group”. 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant 0.328*** 0.155*** 0.148*** 
 (0.217) (0.494) (0.487) 
UNCERTAINTY    
Transversality 1.349 1.467* 2.227*** 
(0.175) (0.192) (0.235) 
Standard-setting 1.312** 1.389*** 1.703*** 
(0.094) (0.100) (0.123) 
Transversality * 
Standard-setting 
  0.709*** 
  (0.108) 
SALIENCE    
Formal Council meeting 1.632 1.739 1.666 
(0.381) (0.423) (0.430) 
Responses to public consultation 1.000 1.000 1.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CONTROL VARIABLES    
Commission service  - - 
DG Climate Action  1.056 1.023 
 (0.675) (0.658) 
DG Environment  0.683 0.748 
 (0.536) (0.533) 
DG Internal Market and Services  1.388 1.154 
 (0.467) (0.468) 
Legal act  2.536** 2.419* 









‒2LL 266.886 256.081 246.382 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.126 0.185 0.236 
Notes: Dependent variable—Use of expert group. Baseline categories: Commission service—DG Connect; Legal act—Non-legal initia-
tive; Formal Council meeting—Not discussed. Coefficients represent odds ratios; standard errors in parentheses; significance levels: 
***p ≤ 0.001; **p ≤ 0.01; *p ≤ 0.05. 
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Thirdly, salience scored insignificantly, thereby 
proving H3 to be incorrect. It could already be ob-
served that issue salience alone could not account for 
the presence of all expert groups in policy formulation 
as the majority of proposals are not salient. This was 
also the case for other research working with a full 
sample (Reh et al., 2013). By way of illustration, only 
17.3% of all issues were discussed during a formal 
Council meeting, while the number of responses to 
public consultations clearly followed a right-skewed 
distribution. The reason why H3 was not confirmed is 
probably because the Commission perceives salience in 
a more ambiguous way than was assumed. It was ar-
gued before that salience impedes decision-making 
which should give Commission services an incentive to 
use an expert groups for consensus-building. However, 
the Commission does not necessarily dislike salience. 
For instance, a Commission service may equally try to 
gain more attention for a proposal when public opinion 
seems to favour its policy position. In doing so, the DG 
then pressures other political actors to concede with 
its proposal. Evidently, referring a proposal to the se-
cluded stage of expert groups would run counter to 
such ambition and hence, this could explain why H3 
was not confirmed. One could object that even under 
such circumstances a Commission service might con-
sult an expert group for a more strategic purpose; ex-
perts can lend political legitimacy to the Commission 
by backing up a proposal with scientific argumentation 
(which makes it harder for opponents to discharge a 
proposal as being biased). Yet there is no reason why 
Commission services should use expert groups system-
atically in this strategic sense. In fact, previous research 
pointed out that this strategic use of expert groups re-
mains the exception rather than the rule (Rimkuté & 
Haverland, 2014). 
Lastly, the control variables presented a mixed 
providence in predicting the outcome variable. Regard-
ing “Commission service”, the distribution of expert 
groups differs across DGs, as was already shown in Ta-
ble 1. The differences were quite subtle between DG 
Clima, DG Connect and DG Markt which is again re-
flected in the coefficients in Table 3. However, DG Envi-
ronment really stood out as a low user, which is why its 
odds ratio scores below 1. The relationship further ap-
pears statistically insignificant in all models meaning 
that variation in use of expert groups—although nota-
ble in the first instance at the level of DGs—is better 
explained by the issue characteristics. Regarding “legal 
acts”, expert groups are two and a half times more like-
ly to be consulted about legislative proposals than re-
garding non-legislative proposals and this effect is sig-
nificant. This makes sense in that the latter involves, for 
example, Commission Communications such as “A Clean 
Air Programme for Europe” which announce a future 
strategy rather than proposing detailed policy measures. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examined whether issue characteristics af-
fected the use of expert groups by the European Com-
mission. An expert group was found to be present in 
33.5% of policy proposals. When reverting to the initial 
puzzle, the analysis showed that Commission services 
use expert groups as an instrument to reduce uncer-
tainty and not as a means to offset salience. These 
findings also speak to other research on expert groups 
because even though the system of expert groups con-
stitutes a diverse patchwork at first sight, and thereby 
reflects to a large extent the sectoral differentiation 
within the European Union, this does not imply that 
expert groups have nothing in common across the bor-
ders of the respective policy niches or policy areas in 
which they work. For one thing, the results showed 
that issue characteristics have explanatory potential 
when studying expert groups. As long as more thor-
ough assessments of expert groups through large-N 
studies are obstructed by data constraints, it should 
not be taken for granted that the expert group system 
itself lacks consistency. Therefore, further research 
could look for determinants of uncertainty other than 
transversality and standard-setting. In this view re-
search on expert groups may benefit from looking at 
research that studies issue characteristics in relation to 
decision-making processes in other executive institu-
tions. 
Finally, Commission expert groups are frequently 
contested for their secrecy, although such criticism is 
usually grounded in more general concerns about se-
cluded decision-making. Committees with restricted 
access, such as expert groups, are considered to in-
crease the efficiency of executive decision-making. 
However, these efficiency gains also incur penalties re-
garding the political legitimacy that executive institu-
tions such as the European Commission enjoy. This is 
so because the secluded nature of expert groups con-
ceals how and under whose instigation politically rele-
vant decisions came to life. Similarly to what has been 
seen before in the context of the comitology system, 
the European Commission is nowadays repeatedly be-
ing asked to make its expert group system more trans-
parent. This has resulted in some minor concessions in 
previous years, but major improvements seem rather 
unlikely in light of the inherent trade-off that would 
occur between the efficiency and legitimacy of deci-
sion-making in expert groups. This research has high-
lighted some circumstances in which the European 
Commission is likely to use expert groups and, in doing 
so, these findings may enable scholars to make more 
finely-tuned normative assessments about whether 
such expert involvement can sometimes be justified, 
rather than contesting a priori that it is not. 
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